The Supreme Court handed down its judgement on the Tata-Mistry spat last month. The Tatas are clear winners.
The judgement makes clear that, on every point of law, the Tatas are in the right and Cyrus Mistry in the wrong. My analysis of the verdict appeared in BS today. It is reproduced in full below.
One of the striking features of the judgement is the excoriation of Mistry's conduct consequent to his removal. I given below a few extracts from the judgement so that you get a flavour of how clearly the SC comes down on the side of the Tatas.
Many of the observations in the judgement pertain to Tata Sons as a private company and a holding company that does not have any business activity of its own. But my apprehension, as I indicate in my analysis in BS, is that this judgement will be construed as favouring promoters in general. The temptation to use holding companies with their nominee directors to control group companies while being exempt from the strictest standards of governance is bound to strong.
Excerpts from the judgement:
i. On Mistry's allegations of questionable business decisions and transactions of the past:
An appeal from the Order of the NCLAT to this Court under
Section423 is only on a question of law. Considering the nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon NCLAT, it is clear that the findings
of the NCLT, not specifically modified or set aside by NCLAT should
be taken to have reached finality, unless the parties aggrieved by
such non-interference by NCLAT have approached this Court, raising
this as an issue. Though SP group has also filed an appeal in C.A.
No.1802 of 2020, the grievance aired therein, as seen from para 3
of the memorandum of appeal, is limited to the failure of NCLAT to grant certain reliefs. The failure of NCLAT to specifically
overturn the findings of fact recorded by NCLT, is not assailed in the SP group’s appeal. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that
the allegations relating to
(i) transactions with Siva and Sterling Group of Companies;
(ii) Air Asia;
(iii) Transactions with Mehli Mistry;
(iv) the losses suffered by Tata Motors in Nano car project;
and
(v) the acquisition of Corus
reached finality.
ii. On Mistry's conduct consequent to his removal
The subsequent conduct on the part of CPM in leaking his mail dated 25102016 to the Press and sending replies to the Income Tax Authorities enclosing 4 box files, even while
continuing as a Director, justified his removal even from the Directorship
of Tata Sons and other group companies. A person who tries to set
his own house on fire for not getting what he perceives as
legitimately due to him, does not deserve to continue as part of any decisionmaking body (not just the Board of a company).
iii. On Mistry's allegations of oppressive conduct on the part of Tatas
The subsequent conduct on the part of CPM (Cyrus P Mistry) in leaking his mail dated 25102016 to the Press and sending replies to the Income Tax Authorities enclosing 4 box files, even while
continuing as a Director, justified his removal even from the Directorship
of Tata Sons and other group companies. A person who tries to set
his own house on fire for not getting what he perceives as
legitimately due to him, does not deserve to continue as part of any decision making body (not just the Board of a company). It is perhaps
this realisation that made the complainant companies give up their original prayer for restraining the company from removing CPM
and singing a different tune seeking proportionate representation on
the Board.
iii. On governance at Tata Sons
The requirement under Section 149(4) to have at least
One-third of the total number of Directors as independent
Directors applies only to every listed public company. Insofar as Tata
Sons is concerned, the Articles of Association of the Company continue to
contain the prescribed restrictions which make it a private company within the
definition of the expression under Section 2(68). Therefore, the provisions discussed
above do not apply to Tata Sons.
Yet Tata Sons has a Board packed with many people who are ranked
outsiders. If the idea was to run Tata Sons purely as a family business, RNT
need not have stepped down from the Chairmanship. Today nobody wants to step
down from any office, except if afflicted by brain stroke or
sun stroke.
iii. On the relationship between Tata Trusts and Tata Sons
Affirmative voting rights for the nominees of institutions which hold majority of shares in companies have always been accepted as a global norm. As a matter of fact the affirmative
voting rights conferred by Article 121 of the Articles of Association,
confers only a limited right upon the Directors appointed by the Trusts under Article 104B. Article 121 speaks only about the manner in which
matters before any meeting of the Board shall be decided.If it is a General Meeting of Tata Sons, the representatives of the two Trusts will actually have a greater say as the Trusts have 66% of
shares in Tata Sons.
.....Therefore, if we apply Section 152(2) strictly, the Trusts which own 66% of the paid up capital of Tata Sons
will be entitled to pack the Board with their own men as Directors.
But under Article 104B, only a minimum guarantee is provided to the two Trusts, by ensuring that the Trusts will have at least 1/3rd of the Directors, as nominated by them so long as they hold 40% in the
aggregate of the paid up share capital.
I will stop there and urge you to read the judgement in full.
My analysis in BS:
FINGER ON THE PULSE
T T RAM MOHAN
A comprehensive win
for Tatas
They
stand vindicated in the Mistry saga, but what is legally
sound may not conform
to the best standards of governance
In October 2016, Cyrus Mistry was
removed as executive chairman
of Tata Sons, the holding company of the Tata group. A huge
controversy erupted
thereafter.
Mr Mistry
claimed that he was removed because he was trying to set
right many things that
were wrong with the Tata group, including questionable
business decisions and
transactions of the past. He said his removal as executive
chairman without any
notice and without any explanation was illegal.
Mr Mistry moved the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT) in
the matter. In July 2018, the NCLT dismissed Mr Mistry’s
petition. He then moved the NCLT Appellate
Tribunal (NCLAT) against the NCLT order. In December 2019,
the NCLAT granted Mr
Mistry’s appeal and ordered that he be restored as executive
chairman of Tata
Sons.
Last month, the Supreme Court (SC)
ruled in the matter.
It set aside the orders of the NCLAT and rejected all the
substantive contentions of Mr
Mistry/the Shapoorji Palonji (SP) group.
The Tata group could not have asked for a more comprehensive
win. However, the implications
of the verdict for important questions of corporate
governance are somewhat
unclear.
The SC’s verdict may baffle many who
have watched the
long drawn-out battle between Ratan Tata and Mr Mistry.
Common sense suggested
that some of Mr Mistry’s complaints,
especially the one about his summary removal as executive
chairman, had
substance. Alas, common sense is no guide to the law. The
SC’s 282-page,
rigorously argued order is worth reading. It makes clear
that the law is emphatically
in favour of the Tatas. Students of company law will
especially find the
references to the evolution of company law and judicial
precedents compelling.
In its petition to the NCLT, the SP
group had made
serious allegations about various transactions and business
decisions of the
Tata group, such as those related to the Sterling group of
companies, the
acquisition of Corus in the UK and the Nano car project.
The NCLT rejected these allegations. The NCLAT
did not overturn the findings of the NCLT on these points.
Nor did the SP
group, in its appeal to the SC, question the failure of
NCLAT to do so. The SC
takes the position, therefore, that the NCLT findings in
respect of the
allegations made by the SP group are final.
One of the key issues in the tussle
between Mr Mistry and Mr Tata was the suddenness
of Mr Mistry’s ouster as executive chairman in October 2016.
There had been no
indication of any dissatisfaction with Mr Mistry’s
leadership until then. The
Tata group had performed well under his stewardship. The
Nominations and
Remuneration Committee of the board of Tata Sons had
endorsed his performance
and recommended a pay hike. Mr Mistry contended that the
manner of his removal
was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to minority
shareholders.
The SC’s response to this point is
interesting. It
suggests that if there had been oppressive conduct on the
part of the Tatas,
the group could not have done well under
Mr Mistry’s stewardship. Nor could the board members
and Mr Mistry have formed themselves into a
“mutual admiration society” until his ouster.
The lay person may well ask: How did
the “mutual
admiration society” dissolve all of a sudden in October
2016? What exactly were
the grounds for Mr Mistry’s abrupt removal? The Tatas told
the SC they had lost
trust and confidence in Mr Mistry. At what point did this
happen and why? We do
not have an answer.
The SP group contended that no
advance notice was given
to Mr Mistry regarding his removal nor did the item figure
on the agenda of the
meeting in which he was removed. The
SC takes the view that, according to
the Articles of Association of Tata Sons, advance notice is
required only where
a director wants to raise a
particular matter at a board meeting. There is no such
requirement for the board
taking up an agenda. A sense of unease remains. The abrupt
removal may have been in conformity with
the law. But can we
say that it conforms to the best standards of governance?
The relationship between Tata Trusts
and Tata Sons has
been very much in the limelight. Two Trusts of the Tatas
have the right to
nominate one third of the directors on the board of Tata
Sons. At Tata Sons,
matters that required the approval of the majority of board
members required
the affirmative votes of the directors nominated by the Tata
Trusts. In effect,
the two Tata Trusts exercise veto powers on the board of
Tata Sons. The SP
group argued that such a situation was against the
norms of good governance. But the norms of good governance
under the Companies Act 2013, the SC points out, apply to
public and listed
companies. A private company such as Tata Sons is not
subject to these norms.
The SP group had argued that the
nominees of Tata Trusts
on the board of Tata Sons were conflicted between their
obligations to the
Trusts and those towards Tata Sons. The SC thinks that the
conflicting
obligations of Tata Trusts’ nominee directors are inevitable
and not
inconsistent with the statutes.
The SC notes that Tata Trusts are
charitable trusts. Tata
Sons is a holding company and is not engaged in any business
activity. The
nominee directors of Tata Trusts on the board of Tata Sons
are thus not on the
same footing as a company’s directors appointed at a general
meeting of the
company. The SC goes so far as to suggest that it may not be
practical to
expect all directors on a board to exercise independent
judgement. If they did
so, there would be no need for a category called
“independent directors”!
These observations raise interesting
questions. Can
promoters operate through trusts, holding companies and
nominee directors and render
themselves exempt from conflicts of interest? Can directors
other than
independent directors in non-holding companies allow their
obligations to
promoters to override those towards other shareholders? Can
the government’s
nominee directors on public sector companies claim
a similar
exemption?
Mr Mistry had asked for proportional
representation on the board for his group. The SC makes it
clear that there is no
such provision under law for a company, whether public or
private. At the most,
small shareholders in a listed company
can be enabled to elect one director.
The Tatas stand vindicated in the
matter. They will find most gratifying
the SC’s point that Tata Sons has been well ahead of the
legal curve in respect
of the functioning of its board. But what is legally sound
does not always
conform to the best standards of governance. Many will wish
the Tata group to stay
ahead of the governance curve as well. One way to do so may
be to unilaterally
subject Tata Sons to even higher standards of governance by
making Tata Sons a
public, listed company.