I identify four broad economic trends from which there is no escape for the Indian
economy:
1. Government capital expenditure will drive the economy in the medium-term.
2. 2. High fiscal deficits are here to stay.
3. 3. Inflation will be higher than before
4. 4. Self-reliance and import-substitution
are a reality
The macroeconomic
outcomes that we can realise will be constrained by these four trends.
More in my BS article, Four economic trends that will impact India.
Four economic
trends that will impact India
There are four broad trends that will impact the Indian economy in the years to come. The Budget for 2023-24 affirms these trends.
1. Government
capital expenditure will drive the economy in the
medium-term: The latest Economic Survey underlines the fact that government
capital expenditure has risen from a long-term average of 1.7 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP)in the period FY09 to FY20 to an estimated 2.9 per
cent of GDP in FY23. The latest central Budget expects capex to rise to 3.3 per
cent of GDP in FY24.
This points
to an inconvenient fact: Private investment has remained sluggish and the government
has had to compensate. The behaviour of private investment is not unique to
India. It is part of a trend that is seen in emerging and developing economies
(EMDEs). As the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (2023) points
out, investment growth in EMDEs in 2022 remained about 5 percentage point below
the 2000-21 average, and nearly 0.5 percentage point below in EMDEs excluding
China.
The World
Bank does not see private investment returning to the level suggested by the
pre-pandemic trend through 2024. It lists several factors responsible for the
slowdown in investment growth in EMDEs: Slower output growth in 2010-19; lower
commodity prices; lower and more volatile capital inflows to EMDEs; higher
economic and geopolitical uncertainty; and a substantial build-up of public and
private debt. Many of these factors apply to India.
The
government sees a sharp rise in capex in FY24 as boosting output
growth. This overlooks the fact that the fiscal deficit is projected to decline
by 0.5 per cent of GDP in FY24. We have a withdrawal of stimulus, something
that is contractionary in nature.
True, the
composition of expenditure has shifted even more towards capex, and this is
expansionary. But this effect can overwhelm the contractionary effect of a
fiscal deficit decline only if the rise in capex is greater than the decline in
the fiscal deficit. In the budgetary projections, the rise in capex
is 40 basis points whereas the decline in the fiscal deficit is 50 basis
points. The net effect will, therefore, be contractionary
2. High
fiscal deficits are here to stay: Analysts cheered
the finance minister for sticking to the fiscal deficit of 6.4 per cent for
2022-23, and projecting a fiscal deficit of 5.9 per cent for 2023-24. The
figure for 2023-24 is a budget estimate. If the Ukraine conflict escalates and
the global situation worsens, government subsidies (which have been pruned in
FY 2023-24) will rise and we could be back to square one. We must also expect
sops to be rolled out in the run-up to elections in 2024.
The fiscal
situation can be turned around in a fundamental way only if the tax-to-GDP
ratio goes up significantly (say, above 12 per cent of GDP) or if capital
receipts from disinvestment rise significantly or both. On either count, the
outlook is not promising. The tax-to-GDP ratio is
estimated at 11.1 per cent for 2023-24. The peak in the past decade has
been 11.4 per cent.
As for the
proceeds from disinvestment, the Economic Survey notes that total proceeds from
sale of equity in public sector units (PSUs) amounted to ~4 trillion
in the eight-year period from 2015 to January 2023, or an average of ~50,000
crore in a year. Strategic sales have yielded a mere ~69,412 crore in the
entire period. It does look as though the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management target of 3 per cent will remain a distant dream.
After the
global financial crisis and then the pandemic, we are seeing a rise in
government deficits and public debt everywhere. India is no exception. If
anything, the rise in debt to GDP ratio from 81 to 85 per cent between 2005 and
2021 looks modest in comparison with the increases elsewhere-- 66 to 128 per
cent in the US; 39 to 95 per cent in the UK; 26 to 72 per cent in China; and 69
t 93 per cent in Brazil. India’s public debt position looks even better when we
take into account the fact that 95 per cent of the liabilities are domestic,
and we have the growth-interest differential working in our favour.
3.Inflation
will be higher than before: High fiscal deficits can be expected to
translate into high inflation. That apart, de-globalisation will happen in a greater
or lesser degree. The movement may be gradual, but the direction is clear
enough.
Globalisation
was about procuring goods and services at the lowest cost from almost anywhere
in the world. Princeton historian Harold James noted recently that there is a
historical pattern of globalisation driving disinflation. Alas, it appears the
trend towards globalisation is now being disrupted.
Post-Covid
and post-Ukraine, every country is reassessing its extent of dependence on
outside suppliers from a range of goods and services. The US and its allies are
determined to reduce dependence on China to the maximum extent possible as the
containment of China has become the West’s strategic priority.
There has
been serious academic discussion in the US about revising upwards the inflation
target of 2 per cent so that monetary policy has more room for
manoeuvre in the downward direction. In India, the inflation target of 4 per
cent threatens to become largely notional. We would be thankful now
if inflation falls below 6 per cent.
4. Self-reliance and import-substitution are a reality: For the
reasons cited in (3) above, “make at home” will gain in importance. This will
be especially important for leading economic and military powers. As India
moves towards becoming the third largest economy in the world with matching
military clout, a lurch towards greater self-reliance is inevitable. We need
not be unduly apologetic about this trend: We are only falling in line with a
worldwide trend. The adjustments in tariffs in the recent Budget, analysts have
noted, are aimed at helping domestic industry.
It’s no use
bemoaning the trend towards protectionism in various economies, including
India. It makes no more sense instead to make a
success of schemes such as Production-Linked Incentives. We must find ways to
limit abuse of discretion in industrial policy. We need to monitor the
effectiveness of the PLI scheme using appropriate metrics. Industrial policy
will be integral to economic policy in the years to come.
Macroeconomic outcomes in the coming years will be governed by the four trends outlined above.
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