Rupee slide: is there a case for a rate hike?

 The fall in the exchange rate of the rupee is the biggest concern at the moment. 

The current account deficit is expected to widen to around 2 per cent of gdp in the wake of the surge in oil prices. That is not a big deal by historical standards. We were comfortable with a CAD of at least up to 2.5 per cent of gdp, meaning we could find enough sources of foreign capital to finance the deficit.

Not so today. FII flows have been hugely negative and net FDI too has been negative. We could get public sector companies to raise foreign borrowings with a commitment from the government to cover exchange rate risk. We could resort to NRI foreign currency deposits. And the like.

But why not just raise the policy rate?

Former MPC member, Janak Raj, writing in BS, argues that we should not. He gives his reasons.

Empirical evidence suggests that defending an exchange rate with interest rates rarely works except in a full-blown panic, and even then, it requires very sharp hikes.

In theory, that's not true. Any rate hike, by raising the differential with respect to rates abroad, must cause the rupee to strengthen. Maybe not appreciably. But it should certainly help halt the relentless slide in the rupee. 

Further, he argues: 

The policy rate is an instrument for inflation control. Since exchange rate depreciation impacts inflation, the policy rate should be raised only if inflation breaches the target. That is, the MPC should only be concerned with exchange rate pass-through to inflation. 

By implication, the MPC should react only if the inflation rate exceeds the upper band of 6 per cent. At present, inflation is projected to be around 5 per cent.

The problem is that, if the MPC were to wait until the upper band is breached, the fall in the rupee would have fallen far too far for comfort. The momentum of rupee depreciation may become irreversible. Every fall in the exchange rate of the rupee has its implications for the fiscal deficit, given the reluctance to pass on prices fully to the consumer. 

So, with inflation projected to be in the region of 5 per cent, a judgement has to be made. Given the current geo-political situation, is there a prospect of oil prices rising above, say, $110 per barrel? Even at the present level, are FII outflows likely to persisit?

If the answers are in the affirmative, then there is a heightened probability of inflation breaching the upper band of 6 per cent. That creates the case for a rate hike. No need to wait until the horse has bolted.

Raj argues that the main problem could that India has taxes on capital gains that competing markets do not have. But that is a new situation. It has always been the case. Nevertheless, foreign investors have come in droves because stock returns in India too are higher so that the post-tax returns compare well with those in other markets.

The depreciation in the rupee is not the entirely the result of rising oil prices. Earlier, investors bolted after India was subjected to punitive tariffs by the Trump administration. Not that the CAD was seriously impacted but investor sentiment turned negative. We were told that they did not view with favour a market towards which the US administration had a hostile stance.

The point about hiking the policy rate is that we can expect the effect to be immediate. All other instruments will take time in producing results. 

 

Moment of reckoning in oil markets is at hand

I wrote in an earlier post that the oil markets are under-pricing the risks inherent in the Iran conflict and that a spike in oil prices is not far off.

Even as President Trump weighs the option of another strike on Iran, it appears that the moment of reckoning in oil markets is not far off. Another two or three weeks of the stalemate could push oil prices to over $120 per barrel. And another strike by the US? Well, the bets are truly off.

If that sounds pessimistic, here are two pieces, one by Martin Wolf on the prospects for the oil markets and another by Amos Hochstein on how oil prices can soon impact the US. 

Martin Wolf gives three reasons why we should be worrying:

• The problem is not just the closure of the Strait of Hormuz but the destruction of physical infrastructure in the Gulf countries
• The shortages are not just of crude oil but refined products. The US is a net exporter but it has requirements of imported crude of specific varieties.
• So far the price impact has been muted by the drawdown of stock. But stocks are finite. Moreover, there is not much spare production capacity.

Hochstein presents an interesting fact. Gasoline price has shot up to $4.5 per gallon. The highest level reached so far in the US is $5.02 per barrel which happened in June 2022. Gas prices are poised to rise because, given that jet fuel prices have risen even further, production capacity is being used for jet fuel and not for gasoline! The implications are clear enough:

Energy prices feed into the core consumer price index with a lag of several weeks. The pump pain of May will translate into inflation figures in July and August. The 30-year Treasury yield has risen to the highest level since the financial crisis and the 10-year Treasury yield is already rising. Mortgage costs, corporate borrowing rates and the cost of financing national debt all move with it.

The oil markets are still banking on a swift resolution of the conflict. If that doesn't happen, 'the largest energy shock in history' will wreak havoc on the world economy. 

Vietnam war revisited: the architects knew it was a doomed expedition

Since the Iran conflict is getting branded as another Vietnam, an Economist article on the Vietnam war is worth reading.

In the war, 3 million Vietnamese were killed; over 50,000 American soldiers died. The US failed to overthrow the government of North Vietnam. Instead, it retreated ignominiously as North Vietnam overran South Vietnam and united the two parts.

Why did the US expend so much resources and lives over a decade on the war in Vietnam? The popular view is that the architects of the war- Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara and others- thought victory was attainable and were carried away by hubris.

Not at all, says the author of the article cited above:

America’s decision-makers were hardly experts on Vietnam and its history, but among themselves and behind closed doors they acknowledged that they were entering a deeply challenging environment, in which triumph was far from assured.

The extensive internal record is clear on this score. It shows the private misgivings of senior Washington officials throughout the years of heavy escalation. The sceptics included McNamara himself, and the two presidents he served: John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. From the time then-Congressman Kennedy visited Vietnam in 1951, during the height of the French-Indochina War, until his death in Dallas in 1963, he expressed doubts that Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary nationalist cause could be subdued by military means. Johnson—who ordered the “Americanisation” of the conflict in 1965, involving the commitment of major ground forces and sustained air power in order to preserve a non-communist South Vietnam—regularly wondered if the struggle could be won, and indeed whether the outcome really mattered.

If that was indeed so, why did these gentlemen embark on the war and pursue it against all odds? The author provides a possible answer:

A key part of the answer is that for both men, maintaining the course, through escalation if necessary, offered the path of least immediate resistance. They and their advisers had offered repeated public affirmations of South Vietnam’s importance to American security, and of the certainty of ultimate success. It made sense that they would be tempted to hang on, in the hope that the new military measures would work. It was about credibility—their nation’s, their party’s, their own. 

Once you sell a story to the public, your best bet is to make the story happen.

We have to wonder: is the same mistake playing out in the Iran conflict now?

India's new private universities: how much of a game changer?

The Economist has an upbeat story  about India's new crop of private universities. But its title - India's pricey universities want to take on the Ivy League- suggests it is getting carried away. The new private universities could, at bestm become India's Ivy League but that's hardly the same as taking on America's.

The new universities- Ashoka, Shiv Nadar, Krea, Jindal, Ahmedabad, to name a few- are funded by businessmen. The Economist writes:

The new crop of private universities set themselves apart in several ways. From the beginning they have sought to excel in research, not just in teaching. Many emphasise humanities and social sciences, says Eldho Mathews, an education researcher in Kerala—which in other Indian institutions are often considered secondary to science-based subjects and also to training for the professions.

Well, the new private universities have distinguished themselves from the general run of public universities. However, other than Ashoka, which has an outstanding undergraduate programme, none remotely approaches the Ivy League in quality. Perhaps they do not even match the rigour and class of the best IITs and IIMs. They have a long way to go.

The Economist sees the new universities as having to deal with sensitivity to research on controversial issues:

A big worry is the Indian government’s intolerance for research or opinion that it finds irksome. Self-censorship is rife in the social sciences in particular, says one academic. Publishing an inconvenient finding can easily “blow up in your face”. Sensitive topics include religious freedom and the state of India’s democracy.

It's not clear that is the biggest problem. One problem certainly is attracting quality faculty. Not many have established a tenure system, whereby security is tenure is assured after a probationary period of the first few years. Nor is the faculty pay particularly attractive except in a few places. The IITs and the IIMs offer not just pay but quality accommodation, job security and substantial funds for research and travel. The new private universities do not uniformly measure up on these counts. The new universities also tend to have a centralised model of leadership, more akin to that of ordinary Indian universities than the IIT and the IIMs.

That the new universities are backed by businessmen does not  a blank cheque. The institutions are expected to meet a substantial portion of their funding requirements through fees and executive training. After the initial bout of funding, the business backers are often reluctant to provide substantial support. The formula for IITs and IIMs has proved unbeatable: 100 acres or so of land, Rs 150 to 200 crore for initial capital expenditure and recurring revenue grants of upwards of Rs 100 crore - for at least ten years.

The new universities will be preferred to the typical Indian college. But Ivy League is miles away.

US has lost the war in Iran- Robert Kagan

Robert Kagan, US columnist and neoconservative, joins the chorus of voices that say that the US has lost the war in Iran.

The US cannot bring about the collapse of the Iran regime without extremely high costs. Kagan spells out these costs and argues that simply walking away seems the best option for Trump:

Unless the U.S. is prepared to engage in a full-scale ground and naval war to remove the current Iranian regime, and then to occupy Iran until a new government can take hold; unless it is prepared to risk the loss of warships convoying tankers through a contested strait; unless it is prepared to accept the devastating long-term damage to the region’s productive capacities likely to result from Iranian retaliation—walking away now could seem like the least bad option.

And walking away from the present situation is certainly defeat:

There will be no return to the status quo ante, no ultimate American triumph that will undo or overcome the harm done. The Strait of Hormuz will not be “open,” as it once was. With control of the strait, Iran emerges as the key player in the region and one of the key players in the world. The roles of China and Russia, as Iran’s allies, are strengthened; the role of the United States, substantially diminished

Far from being toppled or even weakened, the government in Iran is poised to emerge stronger and Iran will be a greater force in the world than in the past:

The power to close or control the flow of ships through the strait is greater and more immediate than the theoretical power of Iran’s nuclear program. This leverage will allow the leaders in Tehran to force nations to lift sanctions and normalize relations or face penalties. Israel will find itself more isolated than ever, as Iran grows richer, rearms, and preserves its options to go nuclear in the future. 

The question is how soon will President Trump bow to the reality and walk away. The longer the wait, the greater is the cost to the world economy.

Who is right about oil prices? The market or analysts?

 

The oil markets have been far more sanguine about the conflict in Iran than analysts. It took weeks for the markets to price oil at $100- and it hasn't venture very far beyond that.

The markets initially reckoned the conflict would end in four to six weeks. They have been proved wrong. What is even more baffling is that the markets seem relatively unruffled even today, some 11 weeks into the conflict. 

Analysts think that if the conflict lasts for another two or three weeks, oil prices will go through the roof. The futures markets don't reflect this. 

We should know soon who is right.

My column in BS, Oil markets wrong on Iran?

Oil markets wrong on Iran?

Despite the biggest oil supply disruption in history, markets remain slow to react

T T RAM MOHAN

There is one great mystery in the Iran conflict: The behaviour of the oil markets. This is said to be the largest disruption in the history of oil markets. Yet the markets have been pricing oil at levels well below what analysts believe the fundamentals warrant. Either the analysts are fools. Or the markets have been hopelessly myopic. We should know in the weeks ahead. 

After the Iran conflict erupted in late February, oil prices stayed well below $100 in the initial days. Experts concluded that the conflict would not last more than four to six weeks. The disruption to the world economy would not be considerable.

The notion that the disruption in oil supplies would cease immediately if the conflict stopped within four weeks or so was absurd. As The Economist (April 30) points out, production at oil wells cannot be switched on in a trice — it takes several weeks for production to return to normal. Tankers that have switched to other routes have to return to the Persian Gulf, again a time-consuming process. Refineries that were out of action for want of crude oil supplies have to be restarted. The disruption in oil supplies was bound to stretch well beyond any cessation of the conflict.  

The oil markets — and the experts who relied on them — were proved wrong. The conflict did not end in four to six weeks. It has stretched to over 10 weeks and is still on. The worry is whether the oil markets are reflecting the Iran situation adequately even now. Analysts do not think so. 

The oil markets’ big failure was not anticipating Iran’s ability and willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz. They seem to have assumed that because this had not happened in the past, it would not happen now. Iran’s leaders had issued very explicit warnings about how the country would retaliate to an American attack. These warnings were not taken seriously by the United States administration or the oil markets. 

The Economist estimates that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the last two months has taken out supply equivalent to10 per cent of global consumption over the last two months. Oil prices have been slow to react to a shortfall of this magnitude. In the past, smaller shortfalls in supply had caused much larger increases in oil prices. 

It took nearly three weeks from the outbreak of the conflict for oil prices (Brent crude) to touch $100 per barrel. At the time of writing, it is $112 per barrel. This is the price of a three-month futures contract for July 2026. Thereafter, the market sees the oil price dropping to $104, $99 and $95 in August, September and October respectively. 

What do the oil markets know that analysts don’t? The current oil prices are difficult to square with the supply-demand balance in the oil market. Still less do they square with the status of the conflict between Iran and the US-Israel alliance. Analysts believe that President Donald Trump’s upbeat messaging on the course of the conflict — “we are close to a resolution”, “it will end soon”, and such like — has had much greater effect on the oil markets than is warranted.  If the analysts are right, the world economy could soon be in serious trouble. 

Even at levels the oil prices have seen thus far, the impact on the world economy will be significant. The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (April 2026) assumes an average petroleum spot price of $82 per barrel for 2026 in what it calls its “reference” forecast. In this scenario, global growth falls to 3.1 per cent in 2026, from 3.4 per cent in 2024. That is 0.2 percentage points below the IMF’s January forecast before the Iran conflict broke out. This fall does not capture the full magnitude of the impact of the Iran conflict. But for the Iran conflict, the IMF reckons, global growth would have been 3.4 per cent or the same as last year. 

How realistic is the assumption of an average price of $82 per barrel of oil for 2026 as matters stand today? In the first four months of this year, Brent crude has averaged $87. Most analysts believe that if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for another four weeks, oil prices will shoot up to well above $125, perhaps even touch $150 per barrel. 

If that happens, the prospects for the world economy are truly dire. If oil prices average $100 per barrel, the IMF estimates global growth to drop sharply to 2.5 per cent. At a price of $110 per barrel, growth will drop to 2 per cent, which is close to global recession. 

Despite the conflict, US growth in the reference forecast would be 2.3 per cent in 2026, higher than the 2.1 per cent in 2025. While the world languishes, the US remains relatively unaffected. This may explain its appetite for the conflict in the first place. But it’s not as if the US has not been impacted by the Iran war. Before the war broke out, US growth in 2026 was projected at upwards of 2.5 per cent.

There is an important fact that has got obscured in the revised growth forecasts consequent to the Iran war. The war has impacted the world economy in a way in which Trump tariffs had not. Economists had warned of the folly of US tariffs and the grave consequences that would follow. They have ended up looking foolish. 

Three points are worth highlighting. First, world economic growth was unscathed by the Trump tariffs in 2025 and it was poised to remain unscathed in 2026. Secondly, US growth in 2026, following the tariffs, is projected to be higher than in 2025.

Most dramatically, world trade growth grew by a phenomenal 5.1 per cent in 2025, up from 3.7 per cent in 2024. Expansion in technology-related exports offset slower growth in other categories. China reoriented its exports from the US to Asia and Europe and recorded a new high in goods trade surplus of $1.2 trillion. 

President Trump’s instincts about tariffs have been proved right —they benefited the US economy without harming the world economy. What a pity his instincts have let him down on Iran. 

Migrants head back to villages as LPG price hike bites

 FT reports that migrants have begun to find life unaffordable in cities following the LPG price hike and are heading back to the villages. I must confess I was surprised as I have not seen such a story in the Indian newspapers.  

.......Shreya Ghosh, a labour rights activist from the Centre for Struggling Trade Unions, an umbrella group, estimated the number of departing workers was “in the hundreds of thousands”. “The LPG [liquefied petroleum gas] price rise made life unbearable,” she said. “No one can survive on wages even close to [the monthly minimum of] 11,000 rupees.”

In UP, the government has hiked wages by 21 per cent in order to stave off protests from workers. Industry is upset and says that many units will become unviable as a result.

“A steep rise in minimum wages will render operating costs unsustainable for industries across sectors,” said the Confederation of Indian Industry in a written statement to the state government, which is led by Modi’s party. “This may prompt companies to consider relocating or expanding operations in other cost-competitive states.” 

I have to wonder how the Indian press missed the story. 

Olly Robbins and the Mandelson affair: civil servants and politicians

The Mandelson affairs in the UK threatens to unseat PM Keir Starmer.

Starmer appointed Mandelson, now known to be tainted by his long association with Epstein, as UK's ambassador to the US. Before you get appointed to such a post, you have to go through an elaborate vetting process.

Richard Dearlove tells us why the vetting is so important:

The restricted compartments of the UK’s national security infrastructure are clearly defined and closely controlled. To work across them requires “a developed vetting certificate”. The primary qualification for holding a “DV” is integrity, honesty and transparency in one’s personal and professional life. To lie about or hide potential vulnerabilities is an immediate disqualification. Staff who do not meet the DV requirements for whatever reason are barred from positions that demand DV clearance. There are no grey areas or soft edges.

The role of British ambassador in Washington is one of those posts. It sits across a number of highly classified compartments. It is no ordinary diplomatic job. The extensive security acreage of the special relationship includes, for example, the UK’s nuclear deterrent, the intelligence relationship, the UK-US alliance which ties together the National Security Agency and GCHQ by treaty, and other domains of great sensitivity. The ambassador has access to these even though their need to become involved in them in normal times is limited. The British staff that comes under the ambassador’s authority is extensive and stretches beyond those working in the embassy. The ambassador’s access to the US administration is also usually highly privileged, such is the nature of the special relationship.

Olly Robbins knew that Mandelson had failed the vetting. He did not inform his boss, the Foreign Secretary. PM Starmer thus remained unaware of Mandelson's failing to qualify. The Foreign Office has the right to overrule vetting recommendations. Robbins exercised that right, with all the risks that entailed.

Another significant fact: the PM announced Mandelson's appointment even before he had gone through the vetting process. 

Now, why would a senior civil servant do something as foolish as clearing a candidate who had failed the vetting process?

A report in the Guardian explains the motivation:

Robbins told MPs: “I walked into a situation in which there was already a very, very strong expectation. And you have seen the papers released already under the humble address that’s coming from No 10 that he needed to be in post and in America as quickly as humanly possible. The very first formal communication of this to my predecessor from No 10’s private office being that they wanted all this done at pace and Mandelson in post before [Donald Trump’s] inauguration.”

Asked who in No 10 had applied pressure, he said it was mainly the prime minister’s private office, which is staffed by civil servants. But he added: “I think that the private office would only have been [putting on] this pressure themselves if they were under pressure.”

In other words, Robbins knew that the PM expected him to clear the appointment and he proceeded to do just that.

Nothing novel here.

What Robbins describes is universal: survival and progress in the civil service are contingent on the civil servant reading the mind of the politician and doing the needful. The politician will rarely be explicit about his requirement. The civil servant must have the ability to pick up cues, to anticipate - and to oblige.

By the time the civil servant reaches the top, he's entirely accustomed to such behaviour. 

That raises the question: why would you do all this after reaching the top?

One reason is that if you don't, you will be sidelined in your job. The more important reason is that there are sinecures to look forward to if you cater to the politician's needs: in the UK, a knighthood, an ambassadorship, member of Parliament, etc.

If you ready to hang up your boots after retirement, you can act correctly and conscientiously. But what civil servant would want to retire when there are plums to be had after retirement?