Archegos debacle: do banks know what risk management is?

There we go again. Archegos, a hedge fund, has blown up and it's causing huge holes in the balance sheets of banks that were exposed to it. Credit Suisse is due to disclose losses, running perhaps into billions of dollars, due to its exposure to Archegos (and a finance company, Greesnsill). The head of risk at Credit Suisse is among the executives who will depart, reports FT.

LTCM all over again? Well, it's not quite as catastrophic in its impact as LTCM but it does reflect poorly on risk management at banks.

As in the case of LTCM, banks were exposed to Archegos through loans and derivatives, with the difference that the loan and derivatives exposures were intertwined in this caes. Banks made large loans to Archegos. Archegos invested these in stocks and entered into a total return swap with banks. Under the arrangement, banks would be paid a fee plus interest on their loans. The capital gain on stocks would belong to Archegos. As long as the stocks appreciated, no problem. But if they didn't, there could be a problem.

As it turned out, the stocks owned by Archegos did lose value. Banks thought they were protected by cash collateral. They also thought they were protected because the stocks were highly liquid. But we do know from LTCM that when any one entity has a large exposure to a security, liquidity can vanish quickly. As the stocks lost value, banks demanded more collateral. Archegos tried to sell its stocks to raise cash but the positions were so large that the very act of selling caused prices to fall steeply. This meant more margin calls, more sales... and then bust. Exactly as in LTCM.

In LTCM, the problem was that banks did not know the cumulative bank exposure to LTCM. The reform that followed was that banks' exposure to Highly Leveraged Institutions came to be monitored closely. Why didn't that work here? It appears that Archegos was run as a family office and did not have the same disclosure requirements. But if that was the case and banks had no means of monitoring total leverage at Archegos or total counterparty exposure to Archegos, they should not have got heavily exposed to it in the first place. There can be no excuses for the lapse after the lessons said to have been learnt from LTCM.

Archegos represents a colossal failure of risk management. If 14 years after the worst banking crisis in a century, this is the state of risk management at the world's leading investment banks, one has to despair. The fundamental problem at private banks hasn't gone away: incentives are asymmetric. If gambles taken by bankers work out, they gain enormously. If the gambles fail, it's the shareholder- and, often, the tax payer- who is left holding the can. 

Goldman Sachs woes

Goldman Sachs, prima donna among investment banks and once the darling of investors, is today a laggard in stock performance, the Economist says.  A dollar invested in Goldman in 2010 would today be worth just $1.60; the same dollar invested in the S& 500 would be worth $3.60.

Investment banks produced higher returns in the past than commercial banks. Today, J P Morgan Chase earns a return on equity of 19 per cent whereas Goldman earns only 11 per cent.

Well, one should not get carried away by the example of J P Morgan; banks in Europe and many in the US produce a return on equity of less than 10 per cent. Goldman's performance is still good but it's not the star it used to be.

One reason, as the Economist points out, is that trading, which typically produced the lion's share of profit for investment banks, today requires far more capital than before, thanks to tighter regulations. It isn't just that. One imagines Goldman would be subject to restrictions on proprietary trading under the Dodd Frank Act. Proprietary trading is where Goldman used to make enormous profit. Moreover, a bank with a strong retail franchise, such as JP Morgan Chase, would have greater access to lower cost funding the form of retail deposits than Goldman.

Goldman is trying to boost returns by trying to expand its consumer finance arm with the help of technology. This is useful but it has its limits: you need a solid branch network to reach out to retail customers, digital alone won't be enough. Another response could be to reduce dependence on trading profit and to try to boost fee income through more debt and equity placements, advisory services, etc.

A fundamental problem for firms such as Goldman is the culture of high pay and bonuses. Despite falling returns, investment banks have been loath to cut back on pay. Until this changes, it may be difficult for them to boost shareholder returns significantly.

Deutsche Bank whistle blower refuses SEC award

A former investment banker who blew the whistle on Deutsche Bank in a case involving wrong valuation of its derivatives portfolio has declined the $8.5 mn award given to him by SEC ( his ex-wife and lawyers have a claim on some of it).

In an article in the FT, he explains he's doing so because he's unhappy that the SEC let off senior executives of the bank:

But Deutsche did not commit this wrongdoing. Deutsche was the victim. To be precise, the bank’s shareholders and its rank-and-file employees who are now losing their jobs in droves are the primary victims.
Meanwhile, top executives retired with multimillion-dollar bonuses based on the misrepresentation of the bank’s balance sheet. It is therefore especially disappointing that in 2015, after a lengthy investigation helped by multiple whistleblowers, the SEC imposed a fine on Deutsche’s shareholders instead of the managers responsible.

Compare this outcome with a contemporaneous SEC enforcement action against the less connected executives of a smaller firm, Trinity Capital, and its subsidiary Los Alamos National Bank. The violations at Trinity seem similar to Deutsche, but orders of magnitude smaller. Five executives at Trinity were charged, the chief executive settled and paid a fine, and litigation continued against two senior officers. 

He explains that this happened because of the "revolving door" sydrome about which I have written often:

So why did the SEC not go after Deutsche’s executives? The most obvious concern is that Deutsche’s top lawyers “revolved” in and out of the SEC before, during and after the illegal activity at the bank. Robert Rice, the chief lawyer in charge of the internal investigation at Deutsche in 2011, became the SEC’s chief counsel in 2013. Robert Khuzami, Deutsche’s top lawyer in North America, became head of the SEC’s enforcement division after the financial crisis. Their boss, Richard Walker, the bank’s longtime general counsel (he left the bank this year) was once head of enforcement at the SEC.
This goes beyond the typical revolving door story. In this case, top SEC lawyers had held senior posts at the bank, moving in and out of top positions at the regulator even as the investigations into malfeasance at Deutsche were ongoing.

This is a classic case of regulatory capture. And because regulations will always be weak and will be undermined by crony capitalism, the idea that free markets can function efficiently, subject to their being regulated properly, will remain a myth.

Lehman Brothers should have been saved

One of the biggest controversies around the financial crisis of 2008 is about the decision to let the investment bank Lehman Brothers fail.

The moment that happened, it was as though somebody had dropped a bunker-busting bomb on a shaky and dilapidated building. The money market mutual funds, on whom the banks depended for short-term funds, withdrew their funding raising the prospect of the collapse of the financial system. It required a series of bailouts, including that of insurance giant AIG, and the guaranteeing of money market mutual funds' investment in banks, to rescue the system.

One argument trotted out at the time was that the US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson wanted to send out a clear message on moral hazard to big players: no more rescues. However, since further rescues followed the failure of Lehman, that argument has worn thin. The official position since has been that the Fed simply could not provide liquidity to Lehman because it was not solvent and could not provide the necessary collateral. The Fed would violated the laws applicable to it had it tried to save Lehman.

Larry Ball of Johns Hopkins has done a brilliant analysis of the Lehman failure and he finds that the arguments don't stand up to scrutiny. He believes that Lehman was allowed to fail because the US Treasury and the Fed didn't quite anticipate the disastrous consequences that would follow. He also contends that the Fed has failed to provide the necessary documentation to substantiate its contention that Lehman wasn't solvent at the time.

More in my article in the Hindu, The cost of political interference

B-schools: the dethroning of the financial sector

Financial firms, such as banks and investment banks, are out; consulting dominates and high-tech firms are in. This trend, which started post the financial crisis of 2007, now stands confirmed, going by two reports, one in the Economist and another in the FT. 

Mr Lewis charted the ascent into investment banking of the most talented graduates in the 1980s, a situation that still held true as the financial crisis struck in 2007. Then, 44% of Harvard’s MBAs landed a job in finance; 12% became investment bankers. Yet in the class of 2013 only 27% chose finance and a meagre 5% became members of Mr Lewis’s master race.
The trend is the same at other elite business schools. In 2007, 46% of London Business School’s MBA graduates got a job in financial services; in 2013 just 28% did, with investment banking taking a lower share even of that diminished figure. At the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, the percentage of students going for jobs in investment banking has fallen from 30% in 2007 to 16% this year.

What are the reasons for these trends? One, of course, is that pay in banking is no longer as attractive as before. Earlier, you put in long hours in the hope that you could quickly cash out and enjoy life. Now, this seems less possible. But there are other reasons.

Investment banks expect long-term loyalty. Consultants are happy to see people leave after five years or so- and give them business from the other side of the table. Moreover, consulting opens up a variety of opportunities whereas in banking, you are stuck in one sector.

Thirdly, there is an odour of disrepute about banks now. What young graduates hear about these places and the adverse publicity they attract because of their tangles with regulators does little for their reputation.

Fourthly, consulting firms and tech firms are seen as good training grounds for those wanting to become entrepreneurs. The tech firms' casual culture is appealing. And they too promise big bucks:

Tech firms and consultants both appeal to the growing number of students who want to gain the right experience to start their own business. A survey by the Graduate Management Admission Council, an association of business schools, found that although only 4% of MBAs have entrepreneurial experience when they enter their course, 26% say they want to start companies after they graduate.

How are banks responding? In several ways. By targeting undergrads instead of grads, by using social media and competition games to attract candidates, encouraging a better work-life balance, etc. Some are even heroically attempting an image make over:

Some are running campaigns urging graduates not to believe media stories portraying them as greedy or evil. Others are trying to lure recruits by persuading them they will help make the world a better place. Goldman Sachs’s job portal advertises opportunities to work on community projects alongside positions for analysts: “That’s why you come and work at Goldman Sachs, because you can make a difference in the world,” trills its recruitment video.
A few banks are trying to change their culture, taking a tougher line on sexual harassment of female staff and advocating a healthier work-life balance, perhaps even allowing the odd work-free Saturday. For the business schools’ brightest and best, though, all this may not be enough.

J P Morgan hiring in Asia under scrutiny

I read with some astonishment a news item about the US authorities looking into JP Morgan's hiring practices in India, South Korea and Singapore. This follows similar investigations into hiring in China by the anti-bribery unit of the SEC and other federal authorities.

As I understood the report, the allegation seems to be that JP Morgan hires sons and daughters of influential people - and using less rigorous standards than are applicable to other applicants- so that it can win business.

The average person is bound to ask: so what is new? How many companies will the US authorities likewise investigate? And how exactly do you establish a nexus between such hiring and improper winning of business? As the report indicates, JP  Morgan also hires consultants. So do a number of other companies.

I cannot say about  JP Morgan but very often consultants hired by companies are retired government bureaucrats, regulators, ambassadors and others. This practice is rampant in the US itself. And the idea in hiring such people is not just to understand processes in government but to influence outcomes by using the contacts of influential people. The US is notorious for its "revolving door" syndrome- government officials moving into Wall Street and then back into government.

In India, one method used is to give business contracts to children of those in power. The easiest thing to do for politicians' children is to get into the real estate business.The private sector provides the finance; the children provide the clearances through their contacts. It's a terrific arrangement. Nothing unofficial or even illegal about it.

Getting close to influential people- whether by hiring them as consultants or their kith and kin as employees- is an integral part of crony capitalism. How far do the US authorities propose to go in tackling it?

On quitting Goldman Sachs

A senior executive of Goldman Sachs has gone public with his decision to quit the firm by writing an article in the New York Times on the subject:

It might sound surprising to a skeptical public, but culture was always a vital part of Goldman Sachs’s success. It revolved around teamwork, integrity, a spirit of humility, and always doing right by our clients. The culture was the secret sauce that made this place great and allowed us to earn our clients’ trust for 143 years. It wasn’t just about making money; this alone will not sustain a firm for so long. It had something to do with pride and belief in the organization. I am sad to say that I look around today and see virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for many years. I no longer have the pride, or the belief.

There is no end, it seems, to the public bashing of the investment bank. Wonder how Goldman will respond, if at all.

(Thanks to Sidharth Sinha for the pointer)

Do we need to separate investment banking from banking?

Is the era of the financial conglomerate coming to an end? In the US, the Volcker Rule will go into law soon. Under the rule, commercial banks cannot indulge in proprietary trading or hedge funds. In the UK, the Vickers Commission proposes a ring-fence around the core banking activities. The intention is to separate out the casino part of the bank from the essential banking activities.

Some recent events provide an impetus to such moves, the collapse of MF Global and, earlier, the $2 bn that UBS lost on account of a rogue trader. But there are significant costs to reducing the scope of banks- the Vickers Commission has tried to quantify these for the UK. I am not sure whether reducing banks to utilities is the right answer. We saw in the recent crisis that highly focused banks also went under- Northern Rock, for example. Banks have significant externalities on account of size. Between reducing the scope and reducing the size, I would plump for the latter.

More in my ET column, When banks turn casinos.

Investment bankers reign supreme

The financial sector is always a work-in-progress- it is forever being remade. One big change is the disappearance of many merchant banks and brokerages- Warburg, Smith Newcourt, Morgan Grenfell, Kleinworth Benson- and, more recently, investment banks themselves. In the US, three of the top three investment banks disappeared in the 2007 crisis- Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. The biggest, Goldman Sachs, had to convert itself into a bank.

Whatever the fate of investment banks, investment bankers today reign supreme, as John Kay points out in an article in the FT. The banks may have swallowed the investment bankers but it was the investment bankers who got the upper hand over commercial bankers:

In 2011, the chief executives of three of Britain’s four large banks, like their counterparts at Citigroup, Deutsche and UBS, are men who have built their careers in investment banking. When António Horta-Osório of Lloyds returns to health, it will be four out of four. When the titans of global finance today exchange reminiscences, only one man has different stories to tell: Brian Moynihan of Bank of America, who was in charge of consumer and small business banking before he assumed the post of chief executive. 

Kay says that investment bankers had to grab control as they felt suffocated in the conservative culture of retail banks. This does not explain why this happened.Well, it was a matter of who brought in the moolah. Investment banking divisions contributed significantly to profits, often the biggest chunk, as at Deutsche. He who pays the piper calls the tune. If it is investment bankers who help keep shareholders happy, they are bound to be in the drivers' seat. What this has done to the culture of the traditional bank is worth exploring. The more interesting question now is what happens if regulation in the US and the UK goes through and investment banking activities are demarcated from core banking activities.

'Every bloody Indian cooperated.....'

Rajaratnam's bitter remark, given in a fascinating interview with Suketu Mehta (of Maximum City fame), will be remembered long after the present insider trading case concludes. Rajaratnam contrasts with his own sense of honour and loyalty with those of the Indians who were part of his group:

Anil Kumar’s son worked at Galleon one summer. I used to vacation with Rajiv Goel’s family. Their families knew my family. You don’t think this is going to haunt these guys? They wanted me to plea-bargain. They want to get Rajat. I am not going to do what people did to me. Rajat has four daughters.

 In the interview, Rajaratnam contrasts the American justice system with that of his native land:

In Sri Lanka I would have given the judge 50,000 rupees and he’d be sitting having dinner at my house. Here, I got my shot. The American justice system is by and large fair.

Also notable is his reference to ola leaf readers in Sri Lanka, one of whom pulled out his leaf and gave a recording to a friend of Raj's after Raj got into trouble.  Mehta describes what happened:

The astrologer chanted into a tape for 45 minutes. The recording said there was a government case against Raj, that he was in the stock business, that he was world-known. That he had to close his business down.

On now to the Rajat Gupta case. I read with disbelief news reports suggesting that Gupta could get up to 105 years in jail. America is notoriously tough on crime but 105 years for sharing confidential information or even for insider trading? Even 10 years would seem excessive. If I have understood the law incorrectly or  if there is something more serious involved, I am happy to be corrected.

Why single out Goldman?

My earlier post on the fraud case against Goldman has drawn some strong responses. I can understand the anger against firms such as Goldman. But it cannot be that Goldman becomes a target because it has been more successful than others. The case against the integrated investment banking model, with its potential conflicts of interest, has not yet been made.

An article in FT points out the pervasiveness of the practices that form the basis for the present against Goldman.

Of the banks that dominated the market a few years ago, why would the government target the only one to survive the crisis financially intact? It is not because Goldman was unique. In Abacus 2007-AC1, Paulson & Co, a hedge fund, suggested securities for the deal and also bet against it in a swap with Goldman. That feature is not uncommon. According to a recent report from ProPublica, there were 26 deals in which Magnetar, a hedge fund, both sponsored CDOs and bet against them. (Magnetar says these deals were perfectly legal.) They were arranged by Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, UBS and others (not Goldman). There are hundreds of non-Goldman CDOs that no one has yet investigated.

.....More fundamentally, if the other big investment banks had made similar “net short” trades in 2007, there would not have been a financial crisis. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch collapsed because they took massive positions in the opposite direction. Given the cost of government bail-outs, why chastise the only prudent investment bank?

I am no unabashed admirer of Goldman. But it is hard to resist the impression that Goldman is being targeted because it survived and remains profitable. That is quite ridiculous.

Goldman in the cross-hairs

I can't comment about the merits of the particular case in which SEC has brought allegations of fraud against Goldman. But the broad case about investment banks having to make disclosures of all kinds of positions- their own and their clients- is, I am afraid, rather weak.

I would go along with Blankfein that when Goldman sells a package of securities to qualified investors, it is for them to take a view on the attendant risk. What view Goldman or any other clients should not be of interest to them.

I dilate on the Goldman case in my last ET column, Gunning for Goldman.

I find my sentiments echoed in an FT piece. The author suggests Goldman is becoming a scapegoat for others' failures:

......my unease has to do with the possibility that Goldman has become a scapegoat for millions of homeowners and investors psychologically unable to admit at least partial fault for succumbing to the madness of crowds and lure of easy money. The one investment bank that hedged appropriately and enjoyed a hugely profitable rebound is an obvious target. “The idea that Wall Street came out of this thing just fine, thank you, is something that just grates on people,” said Senator Ted Kaufman. Goldman may or may not have done anything illegal, but most Americans do not give them the benefit of the doubt.

Interestingly, the author asks whether the firm's Jewishness is stoking prejudice:

In Goldman’s case, some even wonder whether the group’s perceived Jewishness has infected legitimate criticism of it with centuries-old prejudices against a group with a long history of being scapegoated. Michael Kinsley, writing in AtlanticWire, cites echoes of the infamous blood libel. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd earned rebukes from theologians after writing that “blood-sucking banks” like “Goldmine Sachs” were “the same self-interested sorts Jesus threw out of the temple”.

Goldman Sachs bonuses

Goldman Sachs CEO lloyd Blankfein has settled for a bonus of $9 mn this year, way below the $69 mn he made in 2007 and the $100 mn that he could have claimed but for the tide of popular anger against bankers. The firm chose to keep its bonus pool at around $16 bn which works out to $500,00 per employee. The earlier betting was that bonus plus salary would hit the $1 mn mark.

The top five employees of GS will all get $9 mn but others down the line are taking home more. But I think it's the top execs pay and the total bonus pool that matters from the PR angle- and my sense is that what GS has done has calmed down tempers a bit or at least kept them from spiralling out of control.

Not that CEO Blankfein will starve- as one commentator puts it, his bonus is down to the utterly enormous from the utterly obscene. And one doesn't exactly see a flight of talent of GS or elsewhere because of the reduced bonuses.

A sympathetic portrait of Goldman's boss

FT carries a sympathetic portrait of Goldman boss Lloyd Blankfein, not something that he has been getting over the past year. The paper has been fair to him despite the fact that he declined to be interviewed for the article. But Blankfein does have a long-standing relationship with the FT: he sits on their jury for the Business Book of the Year. ( I am not going to pronounce this a conflict of interest).

Blankfein's background is interesting. He was the son of a postal clerk and grew up in a public housing project in the New York's downmarket burrough, Bronx. Now, as CEO of Goldman, he has a $26 mn apartment in the Central Park area. (That's over Rs 100 crore- you could probably acquire an apartment building in Cuffe Parade, Mumbai, at that price). Along the way, he went to Harvard thanks to a scholarship. That's called meritocracy- the US is what it is because it has more of it than any other country.

More flak for Goldman

Goldman Sachs is set to pay out record bonuses. Its employees should be thrilled and not thrilled. The latter because the bonus payment is likely to comes as a climac to a period that has turned out to be a PR disaster for the once-admired financial giant.

Goldman's soaring profits are today perceived as unfair- the result of implicit taxpayer guarantees and the demise of competitors such as Lehman and Bear Stearns. They are somehow not seen as legitimate reward for success. In the US, a rash of agitations has broken out against the firm. Goldman CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, did not help matters by claiming that he and his firm were doing 'God's work. This remark added various sections of the clergy to the firm's critics.

Blankfein said his remark was meant to be a joke. This points not just to a poor sense of humour but to poor judgement- the public is in no mood today to listen to jokes from Goldman top brass. Blankfein also apologised for the firm's role in the present crisis and the firm promised a commitment of $500 mn towards financing small businesses. But these moves have done little to assuage popular anger.

FT has an article that analyses the principal reasons for the firm's success for so many years now:

Goldman’s stellar performance has been built on two main strengths: a long-standing commitment to making money as a firm rather than a collection of individuals; and a daring boldness in trading and regulatory matters.

....The theory is simple: unlike other banks, where star traders routinely overrule lowly compliance officers, at Goldman the two roles have equal status. “The risk management side is just as powerful as the risk-taking side,” says a former executive. “If a trading desk makes $35m in a week, the attitude at other firms is to let these guys do whatever they want. At Goldman it is: ‘What am I missing?’ ”.

......By cultivating trading and advisory relationships with thousands of companies and investors, Goldman gains knowledge it uses to inform its own trading.

Banks are banned from “front-running” – using specific information provided by clients to trade on their own account before they act on behalf of customers. But they can, and do, use aggregate information, “market colour” gleaned from their interactions with investors, hedge funds and companies. By virtue of being the world’s largest and best-connected trader, Goldman has turned this into an art that has raised rivals’ eyebrows but not sparked regulators’ attention.

So, what does it add up to? Good people and risk management, of course, but also superior information and networking. In the present environment, add implicit government backing and weaker competition. The short point: profits at Goldmanare not driven exclusively by superior skills. Hence the widespread public hostility.

Goldman may look invincible for now. But a basic truth can't be wished away: business cannot succeed in the face of hostility. Just one false step somewhere and the regulators, politicians, media and the social sector will come down on Goldman like a ton of bricks. The biggest challenge for the firm is softening popular anger. It's doubtful that a deep-rooted culture can change sufficiently for the purpose.

Regulating Goldman Sachs

John Gapper, writing in FT, makes three suggestions for regulating Goldman. One, hive off private equity and hedge fund from Goldman but allow market-making and investment banking activities to continue. Two, allow it to fail in future. Three, revert to the compensation structure Goldman had when it was a partnership- that is, 90% of all bonuses to be retained until retirement. Then, top managers cannot cash out even while placing the firm in jeopardy.

I think one and three are good suggestions although the difficulty with three is that it cannot be applied only to Goldman- you would need an industry-wide norm. It's the second that poses a problem. How do you regulate Goldman so that it is allowed to fail? I can't see any easy solution.

It's interesting, though, that Goldman today makes little money from proprietary trading- only 10% of revenues. The biggest money-spinner is market-making and, there, Goldman is not betting its own money. The basic principle that Gapper espouses is a sound one: there has to be some restriction on the scope of activities of firms that have the backing of taxpayer money in principle.

More Goldman bashing

One rival Wall Street executive describes Goldman (with rueful admiration) as “a bunch of clever thugs”. He means that Goldman has been tough about seizing profitable opportunities even if that involves, for example, bidding for an asset against a former client.

The above from an FT article, the latest in Goldman-bashing. Goldman thinks it's free to do what it likes because it has returned the government capital of $10 bn infused last year. Not true, as the article points out. When it got capital, Goldman was an investment bank. Today, it is a bank. Goldman today is a high-risk institution gambling with people's money. That is not an internal problem of Goldman, it is a systemic issue.

Demonising Wall Street

From the Economist:

At a hearing in February a Congressman addressed JP Morgan Chase's boss, Jamie Dimon, as "Mr Demon". Deliberate or not, it captured the mood.

I guess you could say that, on Wall Street, such CEOs come a Dimon-a-dozen.

Incidentally, Oliver Stone is planning a sequel to his movie,"Wall Street", that features an institution resembling Goldman Sachs. It is due in cinemas next spring. Hopefully, with the recovery gaining ground by then, it will run to full houses.

Small banks, manageable banks

I wrote earlier that we needed banks that idiots could manage and this meant that banks should not become too large or complex. The Economist carries a profile of a successful East European bank wherein the banker talks about the virtues of being small. The bank is Erste Bank,Austria's second biggest. Its CEO says banks should stay small because they can't attract the best talent, only mediocre people.

People who want to make a lot of money fast go to work in investment banks, but people who work in commercial banks are pretty average people," says Mr Treichl in an office so understated that it almost seems calculatedly so...."We should not think we can invent something brilliant. If we could we would be working somewhere else,"he says of the exotic credit derivatives that spread risk, like a contagion, through the financial system.

The banker also points to the difficulties in managing large banks, sprawled across several countries.

If you run something like Citi how the hell do you know what's going on in Poland if you only go there every three years?" he asks. "This is very much a people business. I need to touch and smell and feel what's going on."

Very true. But I would question the presumption that because investment banks attract brighter people, they can afford greater risks. If this were true, then Lehman, Bear and others would not have gone under. The problem is two fold. First, firms that are beyond the capability of even the brightest to manage because of their sheer size. Then, the problems of excess leverage, which create incentives to take excess risk that even the brightest are not immune to. Greed is not something that bright people are free from.

Goldman Sachs under fire

Goldman Sachs has been, at some point at least, a much admired firm. But it has come under heavy fire in recent months, as reputations in banking and investment banking have tumbled following the sub-prime crisis. The firm's stellar second quarter performance has done nothing to diminish the criticism. If anything, talk of record bonuses has infuriated people even more- the talk is that average pay at Goldman this year could touch a million dollars.

I wrote about this phenomenon in my ET column, Goldmine Sachs is an illusion. On the face of it, Goldman's performance looks impressive. It has increased return on equity while reducing its leverage by half and reducing its dependence on proprietary trading. But, then, Goldman today is a bank fully backed by the Fed. Its borrowing costs are surely lower than what they would be if it did not have an implicit central bank guarantee.

In return for the guarantee, the central bank is entitled to lay down capital requirements and other regulations for Goldman. Goldman's tier I ratio of around 13% is way above the Fed's requirement of 6%. But that is only because the regulatory requirements are far too low and are yet to be revised upwards. Capital requirements for banks will rise, even more so for banks with trading operations and for systemically important banks such as Goldman. The key question is what sort of return on equity Goldman can show after higher regulatory requirements kick in.

I argue that abnormal returns on equity such as the one Goldman showed this quarter (23%) arise not just from inadequate capital requirements but also from other market imperfections. There are others who argue that Goldman was close to imploding like Lehman and was saved only by its alumni ensconced in the corridors of power in the US. They cite the bail-out of AIG and the form it took- cash payments to counter-parties of AIG- as proof.

There's been a huge outpouring of venom towards Goldman. The most recent one is in New York magazine. The earlier celebrated diatribe appeared in Rolling Stone magazine.

Meanwhile, FT reports that Goldman's reputation has been tarnished by recent events.

In a survey of 17,000 Americans, Brand Asset Consulting found that Goldman’s stature – as measured by several gauges of brand strength – had suffered in 2008 and 2009.

“Goldman Sachs still has that Gordon Gekko look to it among the general public,” said Anne Rivers, who oversaw the survey, referring to the villain of the 1987 film Wall Street.