There is renewed talk of a 1991-like crisis following the steep fall in the rupee in recent days. It's good that Kaushik Basu of the World Bank has joined D Subbarao and others in quashing such speculation, much of it coming from ill-informed corporate chieftains.
Many points have been made by way of dispelling such talk- notably, the fact that forex reserves are now worth 7 months imports (instead of a couple of weeks in 1991), India's low external debt, a vastly improved private sector. But, perhaps, the most compelling point to make is that one of the root causes of the 1991 crisis, a fixed exchange rate, is now missing. A floating rate is an automatic adjustment mechanism in the face of a widening current account deficit. When the current account deficit widens, the currency depreciates; exports should go up, imports should go down (although how much depends on elasticities of exports and imports) and the deficit gets bridged as a result.
This self-correcting process can come unstuck for two reasons: one, inflation rises as a result of depreication and renders domestic goods uncompetitive; two, as the current account deficit widens and inflation rises, foreigners lose confidence in the economy and decide to fee, so it becomes difficult to finance the current account deficit. This could cause the currency to go into free fall. Now, let's apply these principles to the current Indian situation.
It should be clear that it's okay if the rupee depreciates as long as there is orderly depreciation. How much should the rupee depreciate? Here, it's useful to go by the real effective exchange rate (reer). This is the exchange rate after factoring in inflation rate differentials between a given country and its trading partners. The reer of the rupee, weighted by trade with respect to 36 currencies, had depreciated by just 3% in June over the previous year. Over 2005-13, the depreciation was 6%. These are both well within the RBI's comfort zone of an
annual variation of reer of 5%. If we factor in weak global trade, then certainly a case existed for a fall in the rupee before the recent decline to Rs 65 (and bounce-back to 63).
A second reason for rupee depreciation is that the Fed is poised to taper off quantitative easing. This will mean a reversal of the flows that came in flooding post the 2007 financial crisis. All emerging market currencies are getting beaten as a result; India is no exception.
Thirdly, as the RBI has indicated in its latest annual report, there is evidence that some of the decline in the rupee is on account of speculative trades- non-deliverable forwards (NDF)- being carried out by MNC banks in the overseas markets. They seem to have been selling short overseas and buying forward here.
Which part of the above can be said to constitute economic mismanagement? The current account deficit has grown wider for a number of reasons. Slowing global trade (no fault of the government); a fall in mineral exports because of a Supreme Court ban on mining in certain places (not much the government can do in the short-run); an increase in coal imports (partly because Coal India cannot expand mining because of environmental and forest area issues); and an increase in gold imports, thanks partly to sustained high inflation. Now, you could blame the government for some of the inflation because it did not contain the fiscal deficit in time. But much of the inflation is food-driven and there is not much the government can do about this either in the short-run (especially in so far as it relates to non-cereal food items).
In short, the government-bashing and talk of 'policy paralysis' we have seen are, in my view, overdone. Certainly, the government needs to do what it can to expedite clearances and see projects through to completion. But issues such as environmental clearance and land acquisition involve questions of trade-off between growth and equity that cannot be resolved in a hurry.
What does the new RBI governor need to do in this messy situation? The RBI must reverse the moves to tighten liquidity in recent weeks (some of this has just happened) and then try to ease interest rates. Further fiscal austerity must be avoided. A focus on fiscal and monetary policy to support growth plus Re depreciation plus a gradual revival in economic growth is what we must bank on.
More in my article in the Hindu,
A new note on Mint Street.