Vietnam war revisited: they knew it was a doomed expedition

Since the Iran conflict is getting branded as another Vietnam, an Economist article on the Vietnam war is worth reading.

In the war, 3 million Vietnamese were killed; over 50,000 American soldiers died. The US failed to overthrow the government of North Vietnam. Instead, it retreated ignominiously as North Vietnam overran South Vietnam and united the two parts.

Why did the US expend so much resources and lives over a decade on the war in Vietnam? The popular view is that the architects of the war- Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara and others- thought victory was attainable and were carried away by hubris.

Not at all, says the author of the article cited above:

America’s decision-makers were hardly experts on Vietnam and its history, but among themselves and behind closed doors they acknowledged that they were entering a deeply challenging environment, in which triumph was far from assured.

The extensive internal record is clear on this score. It shows the private misgivings of senior Washington officials throughout the years of heavy escalation. The sceptics included McNamara himself, and the two presidents he served: John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. From the time then-Congressman Kennedy visited Vietnam in 1951, during the height of the French-Indochina War, until his death in Dallas in 1963, he expressed doubts that Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary nationalist cause could be subdued by military means. Johnson—who ordered the “Americanisation” of the conflict in 1965, involving the commitment of major ground forces and sustained air power in order to preserve a non-communist South Vietnam—regularly wondered if the struggle could be won, and indeed whether the outcome really mattered.

If that was indeed so, why did these gentlemen embark on the war and pursue it against all odds? The author provides a possible answer:

A key part of the answer is that for both men, maintaining the course, through escalation if necessary, offered the path of least immediate resistance. They and their advisers had offered repeated public affirmations of South Vietnam’s importance to American security, and of the certainty of ultimate success. It made sense that they would be tempted to hang on, in the hope that the new military measures would work. It was about credibility—their nation’s, their party’s, their own. 

Once you sell a story to the public, your best is to make the story happen.

We have to wonder: is the same mistake playing out in the Iran conflict now?