Sparring with China over Arunachal Pradesh

China has shown a disconcerting tendency to resurrect its claims over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh every now and then. A few weeks ago, the Indian governement decided to call off a study trip to China by IAS probationers because the Chinese government refused a visa to a probationer who happened to be from Arunachal Pradesh. China's rationale: AP is part of China, hence the question of issuing a visa to somebody from there does not arise.

In his most recent meeting with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of a G-8 meet in Germany, PM Manmohan Singh sought to soft pedal the dispute over Arunachal. However, B Raman notes in an article in Rediff that India has finally chosen to do some plain-speaking on the subject, even if the plain talk does not emanate from the PM.

Raman writes:

While our prime minister has not openly articulated any sense of unease over the Chinese determination to get Tawang and over the strengthening of China's military-related capabilities in Tibet right up to its border with India, other senior ministers such as External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Defence Minister A K Antony have shown a refreshingly new readiness to call a spade a spade in public.

Talking to journalists in Shillong on June 16, Mukherjee said 'he had made it clear to his new Chinese counterpart that any elected Government of India is not permitted by the provisions of the Constitution to part with any part of our land that sends representatives to the Indian Parliament.'

The minister added: 'The days of Hitler are over. After the Second World War, no country captures land of another country in the present global context. That is why there is a civilised mechanism of discussions and dialogue to sort out border disputes. We sit around the table and discuss disputes to resolve them.'

The international community has recognised that the days of coveting the territory of another country in the name of historic legitimacy are over, but unfortunately, not China and Al Qaeda.

Antony told journalists in New Delhi on June 18, 'China has been building infrastructure (near the Line of Actual Control). We are also building infrastructure. Nobody can prevent both sides. There is nothing wrong in that. They have the right to build infrastructure on their territory. We have the right to do that on ours. We are also trying to hasten the development of our infrastructure. They have their perception (about Arunachal Pradesh). On our part, we are very categorical that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India.'

This tough talk is appropriate but one wonders how much it changes the ground realities. There are two areas of dispute: Aksai Chin in the west and Arunachal in the east. Aksai Chin then was more crucial to China than Arunachal because through Aksai Chin ran the road linking Sinkiang with Tibet. China believed the road vital to maintaining its grip on Tibet. As a result, it was willing to forgo its claims in Arunachal in return for Indian concessions in Aksai China. Nehru rebuffed the offer. After the war, China tightened its grip on Aksai China and withdrew to pre- war positions in Arunachal.

In recent years, China's approach has been to treat Aksai Chin as history and to re-assert its claims on Arunachal. At the very least, it would like the Tawang region there to be handed back to it. As Raman notes, China now believes that it needs Tawang to seal its hold over Tibet once and for all.

Raman also notes a point I have made earlier. The Indo-US alliance is not so much about India (and the US) wanting to encircle China as about India reacting finally to China's determined attempts to encircle India ini collaboration with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and, possibly, Nepal. India has thus far not been able to respond effectively for two reasons. One, its historical estrangement from the US. And, two, the relative weakness of its economy (which has duly reflected on its defence capability).

Both these factors have changed dramatically in recent years. The Indian economy's fortunes have changed for the better. And the US, while recognising India's economic strength, also recognises India's usefulness as a counter to a rising China. The Indo-US nuclear deal is really about this strategic alliance between India and the US. The nuclear part is a sideshow but a necessary one. The US cannot transfer sophisticated defence and other technologies to India unless it is seen to have brought India broadly within the non-proliferation regime.

There you have the answer to a question that many critics of the Indo-US nuclear deal have raised: why can't we have a closer relationship with the US minus the nuclear deal? You can't because, without some understanding being reached on India's nuclear status, the rest of it can't happen.